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Abstract 
The obligations and rights of the contracting parties are typically set out in the conditions of 
contract. The attempt to have a ‘water-proof’ contract that caters for all eventualities has 
turned contracts into management manuals with detailed contractual procedures to deal with, 
inter alia, performance, changes, payment, approval and dispute resolution. Contract 
disputes therefore have to be negotiated within the ambits of the contracts. This study 
revisits the assumption of free negotiation that underpins most conventional negotiation 
studies, i.e. negotiation is free with rational negotiators who can walk away from the 
negotiating table at will. Constraints imposed by a contract are collectively described as 
contract governance. With taxonomies developed through Principal Component Factor 
Analyses (PCFA) for contract governance (CG) and negotiating behaviors (NH), the 
influence of CG and NH is explored by a Pearson Correlation Analysis (PCA). In general, it 
was found that dominating and obliging behaviors are mostly influenced by CG while 
compromising behavior is least influenced. It was further found that procedural 
requirements influence all types of negotiators under the Rahim Organizational Conflict 
Inventory except integrators. This suggests that if negotiators are having concern for both 
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themselves as well as their counterparts, amicable settlement is possible notwithstanding the 
complex procedural requirements. 
 
Introduction 
Construction activities are regulated by contracts that define obligations and rights of the 
contracting parties. As project complexities increase, contracts have evolved and now 
function more like management manuals detailing the contractual procedures to deal with, 
inter alia, the performance, changes, payment, approval and dispute resolution. These details 
can be solely procedural, but in many instances, are having time and cost implications. 
These constraints are collectively identified as contract governance (CG) for the study 
reported in this paper. Negotiation studies typically assume free negotiation (Zack 1994; 
Loosemore 1999; Ren et al. 2002; Cheeks 2003). This study aims to revisit this assumption 
and explore the influence of contract governance on construction dispute negotiation.  
 
Influence of Contract Governance on Negotiating Behaviors 
Undoubtedly, negotiation behaviors are affected by many factor groups. The one that has 
mostly been reported is personality (Allred 2000; Baxter 1972; Lytle et al. 1999; 
Mintu-Wimsatt and Calantone 1996; Shell 2001; Terhune 1970). This is particularly relevant 
in negotiations among individuals. However, when negotiators are representing their 
organizations, factors such as organizational culture and project objectives shall have an 
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influence on the negotiation plan, thus the behaviour of the negotiators. In addition, Evans 
and Beltramini (1987) advocate that there is a need to understand the negotiation 
antecedents and introduce the concept of pre-transaction conditions as a factor affecting 
negotiation orientation. In essence, this refers to the contextual elements under which a 
negotiation is conducted. In construction dispute negotiation, this will be the contract 
governance. In this study, contract governance refers to the constraints/conditions that a 
construction dispute negotiation is subject to. For example, the validities of a submission 
and the associated quantum have to be evaluated within the ambit of the contract. The 
negotiating parties of a construction dispute may not easily leave the negotiation table 
notwithstanding that an impasse has been reached nor the prospect of having the demand 
met is slim (Ren et al. 2002). This can be attributed to a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
initial negotiation inevitably has to be conducted within the contract framework. Secondly, 
in most construction contracts, if negotiation fails, the dispute would need to be resolved by 
one of the formal proceedings such as arbitration and litigation. The implication of this kind 
of arrangement can be negative or positive. On the up-side, if both parties wish to avoid the 
costly process, there is a strong incentive for the parties to direct effort and energy for a 
negotiated settlement. However if one party takes an opportunistic move and presses for 
concession by inducing exorbitant cost through delaying tactics, a negotiated settlement 
shall then be very distant. This is because the reaction of the other party is likely to be 
offensive. From another perspective, Loosemore (1999) investigated tactics used in 
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bargaining construction disputes. He distinguishes bargaining from negotiation because of 
the constraints faced by the disputants. Bargaining involves a struggle between adversaries 
who attempt to move, step-wise, towards an agreement over resources redistributions which 
are in their own favor. Construction negotiators belong to and represent the interests of 
distinct profit-making organizations. In this situation, the negotiation plan of the disputants 
take account of the objectives of their organizations as well as the boundaries set by the 
contract provisions. To this end, Cheung and Yiu (2006) advocate that construction disputes 
have of three basic components: contract provisions, triggering events and conflicts. This 
conceptualization highlights firstly the importance of contract provisions in identifying 
construction disputes. More specifically, the triggering event component of a construction 
dispute refers to the happenings that may give rise to a disputious situation. Table 1 gives the 
dispute triggering events identified by Cheung and Yiu (2006). 
 
< Table 1 here > 
Based on the four sub-groups of triggering events and from a procedural perspective as 
shown in Table 1, the list of contract governance used in this study are summarized in Table 
2.  
< Table 2 here > 
The Study 
Figure 1 presents the research framework of this study. Three stages of work are involved. 
The research tasks, methodologies and deliverables are summarized in Table 3.  
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< Figure 1 here > 
< Table 3 here > 
Two key questions were first addressed in the first two stages of the study:  
1. What are the typical behaviors in construction dispute negotiation? 
2. What constitutes contract governance? 
Stage Three of the study aims to explore the influence of contract governance on negotiating 
behaviours. 
 
Questionnaire Design and Data Collection 
A questionnaire survey was used to collect data on negotiating behaviors and contract 
governance. Case specific data is needed to develop the taxonomies, the respondents were 
asked to refer to one of their most recent negotiation cases in answering the questions listed 
in the questionnaire. The questionnaire has three sections. Respondents were requested to 
provide their background and the particulars of their negotiated cases such as project nature, 
contract sum and parties involved in the first section. The other two sections address 
negotiating behaviors and contract governance respectively. For the measurement of 
negotiating behaviours, studies by Kilmann and Thomas (1977), Blake and Mouton (1964, 
1970) and Thamhain and Wilemon (1975, 1987) have been reported in the field of 
management. Among these,  the framework of Blake and Mouton (1964, 1970) that has 
been widely used to identify negotiation behaviors (Hammock et al. 1990, Gross et al. 2000, 
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Chakrabarty et al. 2002). It was used in this study. There are five negotiating behaviors in 
this model: forcing, withdrawing, smoothing, compromising, and problem solving. Based on 
this framework, Rahim and Bonoma (1979) and Rahim (1983) aligned negotiating behaviors 
into two basic dimensions: concern for self and concern for others. Concern for self 
represents the degree to which a person attempts to satisfy his or her own concerns, while 
concern for others represents the degree to which a person wants to satisfy the concerns of 
others. Accordingly, a negotiating behaviors inventory called ‘Rahim Organizational 
Conflict Inventory II (ROCI-II)’ (Rahim, 1983) was developed. This inventory has been 
widely applied in conflict management studies (Friedman et al. 2000; Loosemore 1999; 
Chakrabarty et al. 2002; Elsayed-Ekhouly and Buda, 1996). Rahim (1983) further proposed 
integrating, obliging, avoiding, dominating and compromising as the five main negotiating 
behaviors. The structure has been validated through testing with a large executive sample. It 
has also been further developed in different forms for subjects including supervisors, 
subordinates, and peers (Womack 1988). In this connection, ROCI-II is selected as the 
inventory to measure negotiating bahaviors for this study. The 28 questions included in 
ROCI-II were modified to suit the construction context. The modified questions are listed in 
Table 4. As for contract governance, the questions were developed from the variables listed 
in Table 2. 
< Table 4 here > 
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The respondents were asked to rate the degree of agreement of the statements representing 
their negotiation behavior during the dispute negotiation on a Likert scale of 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Likewise, the constraints/conditions of the particular case (i.e. 
the contract governance) were rated in a Likert scale of 1 (not significant) to 7 (most 
significant).  
 
A total of 252 questionnaires were sent to a group of respondents identified from the builder 
directory and construction related professional institutes in Hong Kong. 80 of them returned 
the questionnaire, representing a response rate of 31.75%. The profiles of the respondents in 
terms of professional qualifications and working experience are given in Figure 2. 
< Figure 2 here > 
Figure 3 summarizes the forms of contract involved in the negotiated cases of the 
respondents. 35% of the negotiated cases were negotiated within the framework of the 
Agreement and Schedule of Conditions of Building Contract (35%). Another 35% of the 
cases were related to projects using the Government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region General Conditions of Contract (HKSARGCC) for Building Works. 
The other forms of contract used included Government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region General Conditions of Contract for Civil Engineering Works (11%) 
and for Electrical and Mechanical Works (4%). All these forms of contract are commonly 
used in Hong Kong.  
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< Figure 3 here > 
 
Taxonomies of Negotiating Behaviors  
Taxonomy is a system by which categories are related to one another by means of class 
inclusion (Rosch 1988). The use of Principal Component Factor Analysis (PCFA) can 
explore the structure of the data to define a set of common underlying constructs, known as 
factors. Accordingly, separate dimensions of the structure can be identified. Interpretation of 
variables can be accomplished by summarizing the data according to the constructs (Hair et 
al. 1995). In this connection, PCFA can be used to develop taxonomies of negotiating 
behaviors. The acceptance of the results is subject to meeting the statistical fitness criteria of 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett’s Test (BT), both measure the sample adequacy for 
factor analysis (Hair et al. 1995). The KMO value ranges from 0 to 1 and the threshold for 
acceptance is 0.50 and above (Holt 1997). The significance value of BT shall less than 0.05. 
In this study, the PCFA results satisfied these statistical fitness criteria. The KMO value of 
the PCFA was 0.650, while the significance of the BT was 0.00. The final factor matrix was 
given in Table 4.  
The PCFA gave a five factor solution, suggesting five taxonomies of negotiating behaviors. 
The items included for each factor are close to the classifications by Rahim (1983). In brief a 
person with integrating style would have high concern for self and high concern for other. 
He/she is willing to generate solution that satisfies his/her concerns as well as those of the 
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other. While the compromising style reflects intermediate levels of concern for self and other; 
whereby mid-ground solution through mutual concession is typical. The dominating style 
results from a low concern for other with high concern for self. The avoiding style involves 
low concern for both self and other. Negotiators with this style tend to withdraw from the 
conflict solution and/or sidestepping the negotiating issues. With high concern for other and 
low concern for self, negotiators with the obliging style tend to give in to the demands and 
wishes of the other party. 
 
The Taxonomies of Contract Governance 
The taxonomies of contract governance were also developed by performing PCFA with the 
same procedures as described. The sufficiency of the data set for PCFA was also confirmed 
by a KMO value of 0.566 and a low significance in the BT. The final factor matrix was 
given in Table 5.  
< Table 5 here > 
The result obtained in the factor analysis suggested four taxonomies of contract governance 
as follows: - 
Factor 1: Procedural requirement; 
Factor 2: Burden of proof; 
Factor 3: Ambiguous provisions, and 
Factor 4: Condition precedent. 
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< Table 6 here > 
The factor names are generic descriptions of the contract governance variables included. 
Table 6 also gives the mean scores and standard deviations of each of the factor groups. The 
high mean score suggested that most of the respondents agreed that condition precedent had 
been one of the major constraints/conditions during negotiation. This finding reflects the fact 
that negotiating parties must comply with the specified procedure if he/she is to avail 
him/herself to other contractual entitlements. Otherwise, he/she is considered deem to have 
waived his/her contractual rights. In construction, such remedies are typically time extension 
and monetary compensation (Rawling 2001). In this connection, compliance of the condition 
precedent requirement shall be first established. 
 
 
Stage Three: Influence of Contract Governance on Negotiating Behaviors  
Taxonomies of the two dimensions: negotiating behaviors and contract governance had been 
developed in Stages One and Two respectively. With these, this stage of the study seeks to 
explore the influence of CG on negotiating behaviors. For this purpose, a Pearson 
Correlation Analysis (PCA) was conducted. The strength and direction (positive or negative) 
of this relationship is assessed by Pearson’s correlation coefficient ( ) that may take any 
value between -1 and 1. A positive correlation means that as one variable increases, the 
other likewise increases. A negative correlation means that as one variable increases, the 
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other decreases (Billingsley and Huntsberger 1990). 
 
Based on the taxonomies of negotiating behaviors and contract governance as listed in 
Tables 2 and 4 respectively, five factor scales of negotiating behaviors and four factor scales 
of contract governance can be computed. These scales are the composite measure created for 
each observation on each factor extracted in the factor analyses (Hair et al. 1995), and were 
used for the Pearson’s Correlation Analysis (PCA). Cohen (1988) offered a ‘rule of thumb’ 
type of interpretation of Pearson correlation coefficient. Based on the magnitudes of 
correlation coefficient, the strengths of correlation can be roughly divided into three 
categories: small, medium and large (Table 7 refers). The results of the PCA were 
summarized in Table 7. A total of 20 PCAs (devised from the combination of four and five 
factor scales of contract governance and negotiating behaviors respectively) were performed. 
As shown in Table 7, among these 20 Pearson correlation coefficients ( ), 11 of them are 
significant.  
< Table 7 here > 
These results were used to track the existence of relationship between contract governance 
and negotiating behaviors. For example, as shown in Table 7, a positive relationship is found 
between integrating behavior and contract governance of Burden of Proof. This suggests that 
a negotiator with integrating behavior is likely to be constrained by the contract governance 
of Burden of Proof. In general, the degree of influence of contract governance on negotiating 
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behaviors is considered by the number of contract governance that shows significant 
correlation with the behavior.  
 
From Table 7, it can also be seen that the extent of influence by contract governance rises 
across the five negotiating behaviors. Dominating behaviors are significantly correlated with 
three (out of the four) types of contract governance: Procedural Requirement ( =.257 at 
p<.05), Burden of Proof ( =.258 at p<.05) and Ambiguous Provisions ( =.229 at p<.05). 
While the contract governance of Procedural Requirement ( =.326 at p<.00), Ambiguous 
Provisions ( =.270 at p<.02) and Condition Precedent ( =.229 at p<.04) are significantly 
correlated to the obliging behaviors. Furthermore, two (out of four) types of contract 
governance are correlated to integrating and avoiding behaviors: The contract governance of 
Burden of Proof (  =.317 at p<.00) and Condition Precedent (  =.412 at p<.00) are 
significantly correlated with integrating behaviors, and the contract governance of 
Procedural Requirement ( =.300 at p<.01) and Ambiguous Provisions ( =.490 at p<.00) 
are significantly correlated to avoiding behaviors. In this respect, these two negotiating 
behaviors are considered to be influenced by the contract. Finally, out of the four types of 
contract governance, only Procedural Requirement (  =.383 at p<.00) is significantly 
correlated to compromising negotiating behaviors. In other words, contract governance has 
little influence on the compromising style.  
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Aligning the PCA results with Rahim’s (1983) framework, some interesting observations 
can be noted. Negotiating behaviors with low concern for self and high concern for other or 
high concern for self and low concern for other, i.e. dominating or obliging, are mostly 
influenced by contract governance. According to Rahim (1983, 2002), negotiators with a 
dominating style are characterized with a win-lose orientation or a forcing behavior to win 
one’s position, they would often ignore the needs and expectations of other parties. 
Negotiators with an obliging style, on the other hand, tend to neglect their own concern in 
order to satisfy the concern of other parties, and are characterized by playing down 
differences and emphasizing commonalities. In the light of these characteristics, when a 
negotiator with dominating style is subject to contract governance during negotiation, the 
degree of concern for self would intensify. This was supported by the positive correlations 
between dominating negotiating behaviors and contract governance (Table 7 refers). 
Likewise, an obliging negotiator who has a high concern for other would give due regard to 
contract provisions. Nonetheless, negotiators who have high concern for self as well as the 
other are found to be less influenced by contract governance. This category of negotiators 
gives priority to cooperation, collaboration, solution-orientation, problem solving and 
attempts to reach an effective solution acceptable to both parties. They are therefore 
relatively more flexible and adaptive. They are more willing not to insist on the contractual 
requirements, thus enhancing the possibility of deriving creative solutions. Lastly, it is not 
surprising to find that a compromising negotiator is least influenced by contract governance. 
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This is due to the fact that such negotiators would give up more easily than the dominating 
negotiators, but less so than the obliging negotiators. The compromising negotiators address 
an issue more directly than the avoiding negotiators, but do not explore it in depth as much 
as the integrating negotiators (Rahim 1983, 2002). In this connection, the compromising 
negotiators would agree to a ‘split the difference’ type of settlement and they would be least 
influenced by contract governance. 
It can be noted from Table 8 that the procedural requirement shows significant correlation 
with four of the five negotiating behaviors under the Rahim conflict handling style 
framework (Rahim 1983). 
In fact, it is common practice nowadays to detail procedures to deal with eventualities 
contemplated by the contract drafters. These procedures are typically technical in nature and 
can be instrumental in blocking claim submissions, at least procedurally. Integrators under 
the Rahim’s framework show no significant correlation with procedural requirement and this 
preserves the conventional wisdom that if both negotiators show concern for their 
negotiating counterpart, construction dispute negotiation can be collaborative despite how 
the acrimonious the terms of contract are. 
 
Conclusion  
Conventional negotiation studies assume free negotiation whereby negotiators are rational 
and can leave the negotiation table at will. However this is far from the real life situation in 
 15 
the case of construction dispute negotiation. It is because most construction projects are 
monitored by very sophisticatedly prepared conditions of contract. The constraints are 
collectively described as contract governance. This study revisits the assumption of free 
negotiation and examines the influence of contract governance on construction dispute 
negotiation behavior. Data was collected through a questionnaire survey. Accordingly, 
taxonomies for contract governance and negotiation behavior were developed. The influence 
of contract governance on negotiating behaviors was explored through a Pearson Correlation 
Analysis. As far as the range of contract governance is concerned, it was found that 
negotiators of the dominating and obliging styles are more readily influenced by contract 
governance while compromising negotiators are least influenced. It was also found that 
contract procedural requirements influence all types of negotiators under the Rahim’s 
conflict handling style framework (Rahim 1983) except integrators. While the use of 
‘water-proof’ contract has become the norm in construction contracting, the sophistication in 
procedural requirement stifles rational negotiation as suggested in conventional negotiation 
theory. Moreover, ‘integrating’ negotiators who give due respect to other’s concern would 
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Table 1 The triggering events of construction dispute identified by Cheung and Yiu (2006) 
 
Non-performance Payment Time 
1. Inadequate site and/or soil 
investigation report 
1. Client fails to pay for 
variations claims 
1. Late instructions from 
Architect or Engineer 
2. Late giving of possession 
from Client 
2. Argument on the 
measurement and valuation 
of contracted work 
2. Consequences on opening 
for inspection  
3. Client takes over the site 
and denies access to Main 
Contractor 
3. Delays interim payment 
from Client 
3. Argument on the time 
extension costs claimed by 
Main Contractor 
4. Main Contractor denies 
assess of the site for the 
sub-contractor 
4. Non-payment to 
sub-contractor by Main 
Contractor  
4. Delay works due to utility 
services organization  
5. Main Contractor fails to 
proceed in a competent 
manner 
5. Argument on the 
prolongations costs claimed 
by Main Contractor 
5. Sub-contractor works 
delayed due to Main 
Contractor 
6. Architect/Engineer 
dissatisfies the work 
progress of Main 
Contractor 
6. Prolongations costs claimed 
by sub-contractor 
 
7. Main Contractor ceases 
work on the site 
7. Late release of retention 
monies to Main Contractor 
 
8. Sub-contractor ceases work 
on the site 
8. The assessment of liquidated 
and ascertained damages 
against Main Contractor 
 
9. Changes of scope due to 
extra work 
9. Argument on acceleration 
costs 
 
10. Errors/substantial changes 






















Table 2 Variables to Describe Contract Governance 
Contract Governancea 
Item Descriptions 
1. The procedures for the issuance of Architect’s Instructions are very complex. 
2. The procedures for confirmation of verbal instructions by the contractor are complicated. 
3. The time requirements for serving of notices are stringent. 
4. Written notice is a condition precedent for monetary claims. 
5. Written notice is a condition precedent for Extension of Time claims. 
6. The obligation of proof for monetary claim is the sole responsibility of the Contractor. 
7. The obligation of proof for Extension of Time claim is the sole responsibility of the Contractor. 
8. The procedures for obtaining Certificate of Practical Completion are very tedious. 
9. The requirements for obtaining Certificate of Practical Completion are not well defined. 
10. The amount of Liquidated Damages per day is not reasonable. 
11. There is no time requirement on the contract administrator to respond to claim submissions by the 
contractor. 
12. The standard of specification is difficult to achieve. 
  








































































Unknown Factor 1 
Unknown Factor 2 
STAGE 1 
Taxonomies  
Unknown Factor 1 




























    (a)                                    (b) 
 








Stages of Work Research Tasks Approach & 
Methodology 
Deliverables 




• These stages of work seek to 
answer the following three 
questions: 
 
1. What are the typical behaviors in 
construction dispute negotiation? 
(Stage One) 
2. What constitutes contract 
governance? (Stage Two) 
 
* Development of taxonomies for 
negotiating behaviors and contract 
governance. 
• Literature review 
• Questionnaire Survey 
















• Based on the taxonomies, 
exploring the influence of 
contract governance on 
negotiation behaviors. 
 
• Pearson’s Correlation • Describe the strength 
and direction 
(positive or negative) 






































Table 4 Factor Structure Matrix for VARIMAX rotated factor solution of negotiating 
behaviors 
Item No. and Content 
Factors 
1 2 3 4 5 
Factor 1: Integrating      
I try to integrate my ideas with the other party to come up with a 
decision jointly. 
.783 -.003 .056 .085 .134 
I incline to bring all concerns out in the open so that the issues can 
be resolved in the best possible way. 
.725 .056 -.091 -.003 .061 
I incline to negotiate with the other party so that a compromise can 
be reached. 
.693 .235 .127 .000 -.058 
I incline to work with the other party to find solutions to a problem 
which satisfy our expectations. 
.625 .262 .110 -.156 .089 
I incline to collaborate with the other party to come up with 
decisions acceptable to us. 
.597 .001 -.308 .090 .342 
I try to work with the other party for a proper understanding of a 
problem. 
.595 -.084 -.127 .096 -.091 
I try to use “give and take” so that a compromise can be reached. .546 .057 .253 .299 -.077 
I tend to exchange accurate information with the other party so that 
we can solve the problem together. 
.530 -.349 -.243 -.020 .165 
Factor 2: Dominating      
I tend to use my expertise to make a decision in my favor. .076 .822 .048 .127 .129 
I sometimes attempt to use my power to win a competitive 
situation. 
.049 .798 .061 .093 .148 
I try to use my authority to make a decision in my favor. -.155 .736 .207 .162 .187 
I incline to use my influence to get my ideas accepted. .162 .705 .232 -.229 .161 
Factor 3: Avoiding      
I try to avoid unpleasant exchanges with the other party. .040 -.144 .800 .317 .005 
I incline to keep my disagreements with the other party to myself 
to avoid hard feelings. 
-.063 .198 .775 .037 .143 
I usually try to avoid open discussion of my differences with the 
other party. 
-.116 .249 .654 -.005 .190 
Factor 4: Obliging      
I am more likely to give in to the wishes of the other party. -.130 -.101 .042 .815 .129 
I usually try to accommodate the wishes of the other party. .293 .303 -.043 .640 -.039 
I usually try to allow concessions to the other party. .063 .004 .274 .548 .035 
Factor 5: Compromising      
I generally try to satisfy the needs of the other party. -.019 .280 .017 .119 .761 
I attempt to avoid being “put on the spot” and try to keep my 
conflict with the other party to myself. 
.197 -.101 .295 -.092 .643 
I try to satisfy the expectations of the other party. .187 .350 .033 .391 .519 
      
% of Variance 14.849 13.040 10.464 9.076 8.840 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy: 0.650 









Table 5 Factor Structure Matrix for VARIMAX rotated factor solution of Contract 
Governance 
Item No. and Content 
Factors 
1 2 3 4 
Factor I: Procedural Requirement     
The procedures for confirmation of verbal instructions by the contractor are 
complicated. 
.827 .077 -.077 -.044 
The procedures for the issuance of Architect’s Instructions are very 
complex. 
.769 .023 .006 .003 
The time requirements for serving of notices are stringent. .677 -.222 .045 .491 
The standard of specification is difficult to achieve. .583 .280 .279 -.050 
The procedures for obtaining Certificate of Practical Completion are very 
tedious. 
.520 .219 .519 .141 
Factor II: Burden of Proof     
The obligation/ of proof for monetary claim is the sole responsibility of the 
Contractor. 
-.023 .883 .028 .241 
The obligation of proof for Extension of Time claim is the sole responsibility 
of the Contractor. 
.232 .865 -.018 .211 
Factor III: Ambiguous Provisions     
The requirements of obtaining Certificate of Practical Completion is not well 
defined. 
.127 -.251 .834 -.057 
There is no time requirement on the contract administrator to respond to 
claim submissions by the contractor. 
-.221 .176 .668 .061 
The amount of Liquidated Damages per day is not reasonable. .369 .004 .571 -.033 
Factor IV: Condition Precedent     
Written notice is a condition precedent for monetary claims. -.024 .243 .151 .860 
Written notice is a condition precedent for Extension of Time claims. .032 .237 -.134 .807 
     
% of Variance 21.672 15.990 15.475 14.728 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy: 0.566 



















   Table 6 Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for the Four Factor Groups of Contract 
Governance 
Taxonomies of Contract Governance Mean score* Standard Deviation 
Factor 1: Procedural Requirement  4.21 1.01 
Factor 2: Burden of Proof 5.22 1.30 
Factor 3: Ambiguous Provisions 4.02 1.12 
Factor 4: Condition Precedent  5.34 1.23 


































Table 7 Results of Pearson Correlation 
Factor Scales of Negotiating 
Behaviors 










































































*Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
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